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FROM ENEMIES OF THE CROWN TO
REGIONAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES: BILLS
OF ATTAINDER' REAPPRAISED
INTRODUCTION
When asked to decide the constitutionality of economic
legislation, courts generally respond with decisions supported by
at least one of the prevailing relevant constitutional doctrines.
Many of these doctrines are based on the Commerce Clause2
under Article I or the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses
under the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Judicial opinions concerning
economic legislation decided under these provisions generally
rely on a well-developed body of case law.
In a bold departure from the prevailing established doctrines
applicable to economic jurisprudence, a federal district court, in
SBC Communications v. Federal Communications Commission,4
recently invalidated Sections 271-275 of the 1996
Telecommunications Act (the Act) on the grounds that they
constituted a bill of attainder.6 The court reasoned that because
'See BARRON'S LAW DICTONARY 51 (4th ed. 1996). A "bill of attainder" is a
legislative act, in any form, that applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial. Id.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part: "To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." Id.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
Id.
4 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997), revd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
5 The 1996 Act was codified as 47 U.S.C §§ 271-275 (1996). These special
provisions concern Bell operating companies or any affiliate of a Bell operating
company and the authorizations, collaborations, limitations, requirements and
prohibitions placed on the companies by Congress.
6 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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the statute applies solely to Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs") or their affiliates and precludes these corporations
from competing in, inter alia, the market for long distance
services without the benefit of a judicial trial, it constitutes a bill
of attainder.7 This was one of the only courts to ever apply the
Bill of Attainder to economic legislation.
Following the SBC Communications decision, observers began
to question whether other provisions of the Act may be
unconstitutional based on the same relationship and grounds
between the Bill of Attainder Clause and economic regulation.
Observers also had general questions such as what is the origin
and meaning of bills of attainder? This article strives to answer
this and similar questions.
Because there are a few Supreme Court opinions decided
pursuant to this Clause and the Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue of whether a statute regulating specific
corporations is unconstitutional pursuant to the Bill of Attainder
Clause, it may be useful to examine the history and use of bills of
attainder in Great Britain and the United States.
This article, therefore, begins by presenting the history of the
bill of attainder in England and in the United States. It then
focuses on the SBC Communications and other recent lower court
decisions. Finally, this article concludes that the federal district
court's interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause in SBC
Communications is, at the very least, a long way from the
Clause's original understanding.
I. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE
The history of Great Britain is replete with rebellions and other
struggles for political and financial power. In response to the
need for swift and effective methods for quashing rebellions;
disposing of undesirable high officials; and solving other
problems associated with maintaining political power; the British
government developed bills of attainder and bills of pains and
penalties. Bills of pains and penalties differed from bills of
7 SBC, 981 F. Supp. at 1002.
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attainder in that they did not carry a sentence of death.
Significantly, both of these bills were exclusively used to punish
people who threatened or attempted to overthrow the
government. 8
Bills of attainder were Parliamentary acts sentencing named or
described persons or groups to death without a judicial decision. 9
Most bills of attainder in Great Britain had four characteristics.
First, they identified the subject by name or described a readily
ascertainable group of individuals. Second, the bills recited the
subject's actions which Parliament or the Crown determined
deserved punishment. Third, they contained a declaration of
guilt. Finally, they prescribed the punishment to be
administered.
These punishments included (1) death; (2) forfeiture of the
attainted 0 person's real and personal property to the Crown; and
(3) corruption of his blood" which meant that a person could not
inherit, retain or transmit property to any heir. ' 2 Those attainted
were treated by law as if never born.13  Consequently, their
property automatically reverted to the Crown.
Although the origin of bills of attainder is obscure, their use
was established by the fourteenth century. One early example
occurred in 1397, when Richard II convinced Parliament to pass
a bill of attainder stating that: "if anyone, whatsoever his rank or
condition, shall move or excite the Commons of Parliament, or
any other person, for the purpose of bringing about a remedy or
reformation of any matter which pertains to the [royal] person or
rule or kingly prerogative, he shall be taken and held as a
8 See Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach
to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 331 (1962).
9 1d. at 330.
'0 See BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (4th ed. 1996). Attaint is defined as
"to be stained or degraded by a conviction." Id.
" See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION 96 (University of Kansas Press, 1956).
12 See generally SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs
OF ENGLAND 408-12 (George Chase ed., Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1938)(1765).
'3 Charles H. Wilson, Jr., The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A
Need for Clarification, 54 CAL. L. REv. 212, 213 (1966).
1999 763
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traitor."" This bill of attainder was aimed at a clergyman,
Thomas Haxey, who had persuaded the House of Commons to
investigate the alleged extravagances in Richard II's household. "5
Since Richard II was clearly more concerned with maintaining his
lavish lifestyle than protecting Haxey's life, let alone freedom of
petition, he readily accepted the opportunity to present Haxey
with a bill of attainder.
Perhaps the most notorious example of a bill of attainder
occurred in the case of Jack Cade. This bill of attainder is
famous because it was applied to one of the leaders of a rebellion
subsequently memorialized by Shakespeare in his play, HENRY
VI.
16
After King Henry VI lost Normandy and his French domains,
great resentment broke out in Kent.1 7  Soon thereafter, the
Kentish army, under Cade's direction, was gathered to march on
London."s For the first few days of the rebellion, the Kentish
army was successful. The rebels, however, eventually met heavy
resistance and fled back to Kent.' 9 During his attempt to flee
London, Cade suffered a mortal wound and died while his captors
were transporting him to the King for a reward of £1,000. After
Cade's body was presented for this reward, it was beheaded,
quartered and conveyed on a hurdle ° through the streets. 2'
Presumably, this would have been sufficient punishment;
however, a year after his death, Parliament passed a bill of
14 See CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 102.
'5 Id.
16Id. at 100. It should also be noted that one of the lines in Shakespeare's
version of these events is the source of countless quips about the legal
profession: "the first thing we do, is kill all the lawyers." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, Part 2, Act 4, sc. 2.
17 Id. at 98.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 100-01.
20 A hurdle is a wooden sledge on which the condemned were transported to
and from executions.
21 See CHAFEE, supra note 11, at 101.
[Vol 15
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attainder against Cade. 2  After listing the details of Cade's
participation in the rebellion, the bill stated that Cade:
be attainted of these Treasons, and by authority aforesaid
forfeit to [Commons] all his Goods, Lands, Tenements,
Rents and Possessions which he had on said 8th day of
July or after, and his blood corrupted and disabled
forever, and he be called within your Realm false Traitor
forevermore.'
Thus, the bill of attainder against the deceased Cade ensured
not only forfeiture of his property and corruption of his blood but
acted as a deterrent for future rebels.24
Although bills of attainder were relatively uncommon, the
British government continued to use them well into the nineteenth
century. The last execution under a bill of attainder occurred in
1798.2' Significantly, bills of attainder were used exclusively to
punish individuals who threatened or attempted to subvert the
government's political power and not as a mechanism to regulate
industry. 6 The latter use is the focus of this article.
II. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
During and after the Revolutionary War, each of the thirteen
colonies passed bills of attainder and other punitive statutes
directed at Loyalists. Most of these bills imposed penalties less
severe than death, and thus were referred to as "bills of pains and
penalties." 27 However, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
the Framers' decided to outlaw these forms of legislative
2 id.
3Id. at 101-02.24 Id. at 102.
251d. at 136.
2 See WILSON supra note 13, at 212.
27 See id. at 217.
2 This is a legal term of art used to describe the people who drafted or
"framed" the United States Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, James
1999
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punishment. 29  Accordingly, they adopted two new bill of
attainder clauses. The first was directed at Congress 30 and the
second was directed at the states. 3' This article refers to the two
clauses collectively.
Several reasons are generally advanced in support of the
Framers' decision to prohibit traditional bills of attainder. First,
the Framers were aware that had they lost the Revolutionary War
and they could be subject to bills of attainder by the British
Government.3 2  Second, many of the Framers were concerned
with the potential threat to liberty posed by an overly powerful
legislative branch.33 Third, the Framers were concerned that a
bill of attainder might be used as a judicial function, substituting
a legislative decision as to guilt and punishment for a judicial trial
and sentencing. 34 And fourth, the Framers believed that the
restoration of commercial relationships with Great Britain was
imperative for America's prosperity.35
Ill. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
Although the Bill of Attainder Clause was mentioned in dictum
as early as 1810,36 the Supreme Court did not pass upon the Bill
Madison, and John Jay, for example, are considered Framers of the
Constitution.
29 See Note, supra note 8, at 330-31.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. This section provides: "No Bill of Attainder or
ex post facto law shall be passed." Id.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section provides in pertinent part: "No Bill
of Attainder on ex post facto law shall be passed." Id.
32 Jane Welsh, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 77, 84 (1983).
33 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282-83 (J. Madison); No. 78, at 466 (A.
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
34 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 217 (stating that as it applies to Congress,
the Bill of Attainder Clause re-enforces the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches of government).
31 Id. at 218. The threat to the restoration of these relationships posed by
bills of attainder directed at Loyalists was eradicated by the Bill of Attainder
Clause.
36 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). Chief Justice Marshall
noted in dictum that the Constitution's prohibition on bills of attainder should
[Vol 15
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of Attainder Clause until after the Civil War. The Court's first
decisions based on the Bill of Attainder Clause were Cummings v.
Missouri and Ex parte Garland. Both cases involved statutes that
were motivated by political concerns. a7
In Cummings,38 the Court struck down post Civil War
amendments to the Missouri Constitution which provided that no
individual could vote, hold office, teach or hold property in trust
for a religious organization without taking an oath that he never
had sympathized with the Rebel cause. 39 The petitioner, a Roman
Catholic priest, was convicted under this statute for preaching
without having taken the required oath, was fined $50.00, and
imprisoned until the fine was paid.4 The Court found that the
State legislature had passed the statute because it thought that
supporting the Rebel cause was reprehensible and that the only
way to punish Rebel supporters was to severely restrict their
ability to participate in society.41
In Garland, 42the Court struck down a federal statute requiring
attorneys practicing in federal courts to take a similar oath. The
Court based its decision on Cunmings and emphasized that
"exclusion from any of the professions or any ordinary
avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded as punishment
for such conduct." 43
These cases represent a departure from the historical
understanding of bills of attainder in two ways. First, the Court
ruled that the Bill of Attainder Clause applied to bills proscribing
punishments less severe than death. Second, the Court's
definition of a bill of attainder omitted the requirements of a
recital of the wrongs for which the punishment is inflicted and a
extend to legislation carrying penalties less severe than death, i.e., bills of
pains of penalties. Id. at 138.
3 See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex pane
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
38 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 277.391 d. at 318-19.
40 Id. at 316.
41 Id. at 318-20.
42 Ex Pane Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
43 Id. at 377.
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legislative declaration of guilt. Unlike the English practice of
including the penalty of death, forfeiture of property, corruption
of blood, etc., the Court defined bills of attainder simply as
"legislative act[s] which inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. )144
The next two significant Supreme Court cases to consider the
Bill of Attainder clause occurred over two decades later. In
contrast to Cummings and Garland, the Court decided that the
statutes in Dent v. West Virginia 4 and Hawker v. New York
46
were not politically motivated and presented no bill of attainder
problems.
In Dent, the Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring
graduation from an accredited medical school to practice
medicine. Soon thereafter, the Hawker Court applied the same
principle to a New York statute barring convicted felons from
practicing medicine. 47 The Court held that these statutes were not
punitive, because they were reasonably related to the
qualifications to practice medicine. In both cases, the Court
accepted the Cummings-Garland rationale and found that if the
legislature's deprivation of rights was reasonably related to the
regulated activities, then it did not constitute punishment. 8
After these two cases, the Bill of Attainder Clause lay dormant
until 1946 when the Court decided United States v. Lovett.49 In
this case, the Court struck down a rider to the Urgent Deficiency
Appropriation Bill of 1943, which cut off the salaries of three
named individuals. Justice Black's majority opinion emphasized
that if legislative acts applied either to named individuals or easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial, then [they were] bills
of attainder.50  Justice Black also identified three distinctions
between bills of attainder and legitimate legislative classifications:
41 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323.
41 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)
46 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
47 Id. at 191.
48 Dent, 129 U.S. at 125-28; Hawker, 170 U.S. at 198.
49 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
5oId. at 315.
768 [Vol 15
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(1) specificity (2) punishment and (3) absence of a judicial trial's
procedural safeguards. This was the first time that Congress
declared individuals subject to a statutory penalty. The Lovett
decision was followed by three cases concerning statutes
conditioning the rights of individuals on a proclamation of loyalty
to the United States. 51
The first case, Garner v. Board of Public Works, 52 upheld a
statute requiring city employees to affirm that they had not
advocated the violent overthrow of the Government during the
preceding five years. Nine years later, the Flemming v. Nestor 3
Court upheld section 202(n) of the Social Security Amendments
of 1954. This section authorized the termination of Social
Security benefits for any alien deported because of Communist
Party membership. In the third case, Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities,54 the Court upheld an order by the
Subversive Activities Control Board ordering the Communist
Party to register with the Attorney General. These decisions left
the bill of attainder doctrine in a state of disarray because the
Court failed to follow a consistent analytical framework and
continued to expand the doctrine to include a broader range of
statutes. 55
The next major development occurred in 1964 when the Court
struck down section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 in United States v. Brown.56 This Act
precluded Communist Party members from holding a union
office. Congress passed this Act in an effort to reduce or prevent
the likelihood of politically motivated strikes interrupting the flow
of commerce. 7  Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion
emphasized that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended to
re-enforce separation of powers as well as reflect the Framers'
51 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 223-28.
52 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
3 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
4 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).55 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 228.
56 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
57 See generally Wilson, supra note 13, at 248.
1999 769
9
Landsman: Bills Of Attainder
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999
TOURO LA WREVIEW
belief that the legislative branch was not as qualified as politically
independent judges and juries to rule on guilt and to levy
appropriate punishment. The Brown decision is significant
because it contains the Court's most extensive discussion and
expansive application the Bill of Attainder Clause.58
The Court's most recent pronouncements concerning the Bill of
Attainder Clause were Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services 9 and Selective Services v. Minnesota Public Interest.
60
In Nixon, the Court upheld a statute requiring the General
Services Administration to confiscate Richard Nixon's
presidential materials for screening, in order to speed the release
of materials of historical interest." This decision limited the Bill
of Attainder Clause's prohibition to laws not rationally advancing
legitimate (i.e. nonpunitive) legislative purposes and announced a
three-part test to determine whether the congressional action
constituted impermissible punishment:
(1) whether the statute imposes punishment traditionally
judged to be prohibited by the Clause; (2) whether the
statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity
imposed, can be said to further nonpunitive legislative
purposes; and (3) whether the legislature expressed a
punitive intent.62
In Minnesota, the Court upheld the "Solomon Amendment,"
which compelled applicants for financial aid to affirm their
compliance with the Selective Service registration requirements
with their educational institution, and denied financial aid to all
those who failed to do so. 63 The Court found that (1) Congress'
denial of financial aid did not fall within the historical meaning of
legislative punishment; (2) the Act did not further nonpunitive
58 See Wilson, supra note 13, at 248.
59 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
60 Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,
468 U.S. 841 (1984).
6! Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
62 Id. at 475-78.
63 Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 855-56.
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goals; and (3) remarks by certain members of Congress did not
reveal an obvious intent to punish.' Both Nixon and Minnesota
demonstrate the Court's deference to Congress when asked to
decide the constitutionality of statutes governing economic rights
under the federal Bill of Attainder Clause.
The Supreme Court has not passed upon the Bill of Attainder
Clause since these two decisions. As mentioned above, however,
several recent decisions concerning the Clause have been decided
in the Federal District and Federal Appellate Court levels.
IV. RECENT LOWER COURT APPLICATION To THE 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
A. SBC Communications v. FCC
On July 2, 1997, SBC Communications filed an action against
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") in the federal
district court of Wichita Falls, Texas challenging the
constitutionality of Subtitle B, Title I of the 1996 Act, codified as
47 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 ("Act" provisions). Since these provisions
are directly related to the antitrust action brought against AT&T
in 1974", a discussion of the pertinent facts in AT&T is
necessary.
In the AT&T action, the Justice Department alleged, inter alia,
that AT&T violated the Sherman Act by using its market power
to restrict competitors from entering into several markets within
the telecommunications industry.' In 1982, after an extensive
legal battle, the case was settled by a Consent Decree, otherwise
known as, the Modification of Final Judgment ("MFJ"). 67
6 Harvard Law Review Association, Draft Registration and Federal
Educational Aid, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 89 (1984).
61 U.S. v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
66 For a brief summary of this action, see SBC Communications v. FCC, No.
98-10140, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21646 (5th Cir. September 4, 1998).
67 U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp 131, 222-34 (D.D.C 1982).
1999
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As a part of the MFJ, AT&T agreed to divest itself from the
twenty-four Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") by 1984.68 The
Consent Decree also imposed certain restrictions on the regional
Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs"). For example, the
RBOCs were prohibited from providing information services; any
nontelecommunications services; and from manufacturing
telecommunications equipment. The restrictions placed on the
RBOCs by the MFJ served as a basis for the enactment of
§§ 271-275 of the 1996 Act.69
SBC Communications alleged that §§ 271-275 of the Act
violated various constitutional principles: including the separation
of powers, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection
Clause.7 ° SBC Communications also argued that because the
special provisions singled-out specific corporations and burdened
those corporations, they necessarily constituted a bill of attainder.
The FCC countered SBC Communication's claims with several
arguments. The following three arguments are the most
important for this discussion. First, the FCC argued that these
provisions did not constitute a bill of attainder because they were
68 Under the MFJ, AT&T agreed to divest itself from the twenty-two Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs). The MFJ further provided for the
amalgamation of the BOCS into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs). SBC Communications, Inc. is an RBOC as well as the parent
company of several BOCs. Id. at 142.
69 See SBC Communication v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (N.D. Tex.
1997).
70 The following is a brief summary of the Sections of the 1996 Act at issue
in the SBC Communications action.
Section 271 prohibits the RBOCs from providing interLATA
services without satisfying a series of requirements. Section
272 requires, inter alia, the RBOCs to establish a separate
affiliate for manufacturing activities. Section 273 prohibits
the RBOCs from manufacturing and supplying
telecommunications equipment until they satisfy the
requirements of Section 271. Section 274 forbids the RBOCs
from engaging in electronic publishing through the use of
their basic telephone service. Finally, Section 275 prohibits
the RBOCs from engaging in alarm monitoring services until
February 8, 2001.
Id. at 1001.
[Vol 15772
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not a legislative punishment but rather appropriate economic
regulation. Second, the FCC argued that the purpose of the 1996
Act was to provide for a pro-competitive national policy
framework designed to rapidly accelerate private sector
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information
technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunication markets to competition.71 Third, the FCC
argued that the purpose of the Act was not to punish either the
BOCs or RBOCS, but rather to replace the MFJ.72
On December 31, 1997, the district court concluded that
Sections 271-75 of the Act are an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.73 In reaching its conclusion the court made several
findings. The court first ruled that the protections afforded by
the Bill of Attainder Clause apply to corporations .7  The court
then found that the specification element of the bill of attainder
analysis was met, because the provisions by their terms applied
solely to RBOCs. 75 The court then noted that RBOCs have not
had any judicial trial for their past or future conduct. 76
To answer the question of whether the provisions crossed the
boundary between lawful regulation and impermissible
punishment, the court applied the three-step analysis announced
in Nixon.' First, the court found that under an historical
analysis, the burdens imposed on the RBOCs by the provisions
necessarily constituted punishment.78 The court then determined
that although the defendants identified several nonpunitive
purposes of the special provisions, the special provisions
constituted punishment because they did not apply to all local
exchange carriers. 79 Finally, the court found that AT&T's prior
71 See Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. at 10, SBC
Communications v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
72 Id.
73 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
74 d. at 1003.751d. at 1004.
76 id.
77 See generally 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
78 981 F. Supp. at 1005.
791d. at 1006.
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allegedly anticompetitive conduct was the basis for the special
provisions. 0 Indeed, the court reached the conclusion that the
Congress intended §§ 271-275 to punish the RBOCs for their
former parent AT&T's transgressions over two decades. 8'
Immediately following the SBC Communications decision, the
court stayed the decision and it was certified for expedited
appeal. On September 4, 1998, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.82
The circuit court reversed the decision primarily because it
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the special
provision constituted punishment.8 3  The circuit court also
discussed the protective or "prophylactic" exception to the Bill of
Attainder Clause. This so-called exception seeks to protect rather
than punish. In this case, the special provisions do not protect
the market from anti-competitive behavior.
The circuit court advanced four arguments why the special
provisions furthered nonpunitive legislative purposes. First, the
special provisions do not impose a perpetual bar, but rather stiff
criteria, on the BOCs' entry into certain markets. 84 Second,
special provisions attempt to ensure fair competition in the
markets for local service, long distance, telecommunications
equipment, and information services.8 5  Third, the legislative
history presents no evidence of punitive intent.86 And fourth
special provisions are part of a larger quid pro quo. 87  All
arguments made by the court lead to the single conclusion that the
Act was not punitive in nature.
B. BellSouth v. FCC
80 Id. at 1006-07.
81 Id. at 1007.
82 SBC Communications v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir.1998).
83 Id. at 229.
84 Id. at 242.
85 Id. at 242-43.
86 Id. at 243.
87 Id.
[Vol 15
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 15 [1999], No. 2, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/20
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
In addition to the SBC Conmunications v. FCC case, BellSouth
Corp. recently challenged the FCC order implementing Section
274 of the 1996 Act based on the Bill of Attainder Clause and
other constitutional grounds. On May 15,1998, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit")," rejected
BellSouth's challenge and held that Section 274 did not constitute
a bill of attainder." The D.C. Circuit's decision began by
providing a brief historical overview of the MFJ, the 1996 Act,
and bills of attainder." The decision then applied the three-part
test announced in Nixon.9'
First, the D.C. Circuit stated that the restrictions imposed by
Section 274 are nothing "like the classic attainders known to the
Framers."9 The D.C. Circuit then explained why line-of-
business restrictions pose no bill of attainder problems. 3 Based
on this analysis, the D.C. Circuit concluded that although the
RBOCs may be burdened by Section 274, these burdens do not
approach the burdens that have traditionally accompanied bills of
attainder.Y
Second, the D.C. Circuit illustrated why Section 274 can
reasonably be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.
The D.C. Circuit noted that "section 274 is less severe than the
analogous pre-1991 MFJ provisions."9 Section 274, in sharp
contrast to the earlier provision, "applies only to electronic
publishing rather than to information services as a whole, it
expires after five years rather than continuing indefinitely, and it
8 BellSouth Corp v. FCC, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9769, (D.C. Cir. May
15, 1998). Section 274 limits the ability of BOCs to provide electronic
publishing.
891d. at *2.
90 Id. at *3-4.
91 Id. at *15-16. See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425 (1977).
92BellSouth Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9769 at *17.
93 Id. at *20. Line-of-business restrictions are also not uncommon. For
example, the Glass-Stegall Act precludes commercial banks from entering the
investment banking business. Id. See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 453-55 (1965).
94BellSouth Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9769 at *21.
95 Id. at *27.
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mandates structural separation rather than complete exclusion. " 96
The D.C. Circuit then concluded that the differential treatment of
the BOCs under Section 274 is not evidence of punitive purposes
noting that differential treatment is necessary to promote
competition because the BOCs have a significantly greater
opportunity to capitalize on their position in the relevant market. 91
For these and other reasons, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
Section 274 furthers nonpunitive purposes.
Third, the D.C. Circuit concluded its application of the three
part Nixon test by stating that BellSouth failed to produce any
"unmistakable evidence whatsoever of punitive intent."98  Such
evidence, as noted above, is necessary before legislation may be
declared unconstitutional pursuant to the Bill of Attainder
Clause.99 Because BellSouth failed to meet the requirements
under the Nixon analysis, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Section
274 presented no bill of attainder problems. 10
V. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the discussion above, the application of the
Bill of Attainder Clause in SBC Communications and BellSouth
rests on a somewhat muddled background. Neither relatively
extensive common law principles nor fairly limited Supreme
Court decisions appeared to provide strong precedential guidance
for determining when a law crosses the line between legislation
and impermissible punishment.
96 Id.
9' Id. at *29.
" Id. at *32. See also Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960).
99 Id. at *30.
10o Id.
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If the district court's and the dissent in SBC's reasoning goes
no further, it may be just another legal oddity, gone and soon
forgotten. If adopted by other and higher courts, however, it
may create a wide-open and undisciplined approach to traditional
Due Process, Equal Protection, First Amendment and separation
of powers issues. That is, of course, until the Supreme Court
agrees to decide the issue.
*:Michzael L. Landsman
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